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This project explored the possible role of collective action among small-scale 
farmers in managing and maintaining genetic resources in a center of crop diversity. It 
focused on the local institutions that ensure the supply of seed of diverse maize landraces 
to small-scale farmers in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico. The key hypothesis was 
that the medium-to-long-term supply of a diverse set of varieties to any individual small-
scale maize farmer depends on an agreement among a group of farmers to manage and 
supply the seed of these landraces to each other, if the need arises, and that this 
constitutes a form of collective action. Six communities were studied, three of them in-
depth. Methodologies used included in-depth semi-structured interviews with key 
informants, focus group discussions, and a tracer study—following the flows of seed 
among different farmers. The results show that, while there is a well-developed local seed 
supply system based on sets of social relationships and involving multiple types of 
transactions, there is no evidence of collective action. Most farmers rely on and prefer to 
select and save seed from their own harvests. There are seed flows, however, and most 
seed transactions take place among people with social links, but not within a well-defined 
group. There are no specialized suppliers of seed, either individuals or groups. Most 
transactions are bilateral and while the most common transaction is the sale and purchase 
of seed, this is not done for profit but out of a sense of moral obligation. The system is 
based on the creation of trust, which is needed because seed is not transparent—that is, it 
is not possible to fully predict the plant phenotype that may result from a given seed 
simply by looking at the seed. Farmers demand different types of maize and they believe 
that there is a strong genotype-by-environment interaction, hence “foreign” maize types 
may not be appropriate for them. At the same time, farmers also find occasional 
experimentation beneficial and believe that they can slowly modify the characteristics of 
“foreign” landraces. In this system, there are strong incentives to be conservative, but 
also to try new landraces and experiment. The local seed system of these farmers is 
resilient but able to innovate as well. Interventions to support the conservation of 
landraces on farm, based on specialized networks for seed that rely on collective action, 
may not work. 
 
Keywords: maize, small-scale farmers, informal seed systems, genetic resources, Mexico, 
collective action  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The research presented here focuses on the local institutions that ensure the 
supply of seed of a diverse array of farmer varieties
5 to small-scale farmers in centers of 
crop diversity—in this case, maize in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico. The project 
addressed the following question: What is the role of collective action among small-scale 
farmers in managing and maintaining genetic resources in a center of crop diversity?  
This paper describes and analyzes the seed system that ensures the supply of a 
diverse array of farmer varieties to small-scale maize farmers in the Central Valleys of 
Oaxaca—an area of significant crop diversity. By seed system we refer to the set of 
sources of seed, ways of getting it, social relations and rules on which farmers rely to 
obtain seed for agricultural production. The original hypothesis was that individual 
farmers would have strong incentives to participate in specialized and organized 
collective action to ensure their access to a larger base of maize genetic diversity than 
they would be able to manage individually. 
 
                                                 
1 International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), Apartado Postal 6-641, 06600 Mexico, 
D.F. Mexico 
2 Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), France. 
3 Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo, Mexico 
4 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico 
5 Farmer varieties (referred to as “varieties” in this manuscript) are the crop populations that a group of farmers 
recognize as distinct units. They may not have specific names beyond the color of the kernel, i.e. a farmer may plant 
two varieties of white maize. A farmer variety is not a variety in the sense of commercial agriculture, where a variety 
should be distinct, uniform and stable.  
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Maize agriculture in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca continues to play a significant 
role in farmers’ livelihoods and food security. Farmers in this region value their landraces 
and continue to plant them, and by doing so they contribute to the conservation of maize 
biodiversity. A formal seed sector has yet to develop in this region, and most farmers 
therefore continue to produce their own maize seed year after year. However, maize 
farmers in the study area occasionally acquire seed from other sources, mostly other 
farmers, either because of seed loss due to climatic or storage problems or because they 
want to try out or work with other kinds of maize. These farmers have different needs and 
require seed of diverse landraces with multiple traits in particular combinations. When a 
farmer wants to acquire seed from other sources, it can be difficult to find seed that meets 
his requirements. First, the farmer has to find out who grows what maize variety and 
investigate the characteristics and performance of the maize of interest. Then he must 
make sure that the information offered is trustworthy and the seed is reliable, and finally, 
the conditions of the transaction must be negotiated with the supplying farmer. Acquiring 
seed of diverse maize varieties under these conditions can entail risks and high 
transaction costs to individual farmers.  
Collective action has been defined as: “action taken by a group (either directly or 
on its behalf through an organisation) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interest.” 
(Marshall 1998 cited by Knox et al. 1998). The concept of collective action has been 
widely used to describe and analyze the management of certain natural resources, such as 
forests, fisheries, and irrigation systems (Knox et al. 1998; Ostrom 1990), but to our 
knowledge it has not been applied to try to understand the way informal seed systems 
operate. As pointed out above, acquiring seed of diverse maize varieties can be difficult  
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and risky for individual small-scale farmers in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca. By 
contrast, in theory a group of farmers could maintain more diversity than any individual 
can, and at a lower cost and reduced probability of loss. Therefore, there should be clear 
incentives for individual farmers to cooperate with each other to provide seed and 
information for a diverse set of maize varieties. Individual farmers may rely on building 
and maintaining networks that allow them to manage and reduce the transaction costs 
associated with accessing seed. If true, these farmer networks can be seen as a form of 
collective action. 
To test our hypothesis, we developed the following operational definition of 
collective action in seed transactions: the actions of a well-defined group of farmers 
linked by a set of rights and responsibilities regarding the mutual supply of seed of a 
diverse set of farmer varieties. Based on this definition, the following predictions were 
developed to examine the hypothesis. 
•  The adherence to a certain set of rights and responsibilities regarding the mutual 
supply of seed would be reflected in the way that seed transactions are carried out; 
i.e. certain rules or prescribed practices would be present. 
•  A “well-defined group of farmers” would mean that the collective action would 
be reflected in the social relation between the people involved, and that they 
should be able to identify clearly who other participants are. 
•  The existence of collective action would depend on its providing certain 
advantages over farmers working individually. These could include lower 
transaction costs for acquiring seed or reduced risk of seed shortages.  
 
Understanding how these networks operate is important for several reasons. First, 
without seed there is no agriculture. Second, under the conditions of smallholders in the 
Central Valleys of Oaxaca, they depend almost exclusively on themselves and other 
farmers to obtain seed of preferred varieties. Third, obtaining seed of diverse varieties  
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under the conditions faced by these farmers can be difficult and entail high transaction 
costs. Fourth, the on-farm conservation and evolution of the landraces depend on farmers 
continuing to plant those landraces, which in turns depends on farmers having continuous 
access their seed. 
The research described in this paper builds on another research project undertaken 
by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and Instituto 
Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales Agrícolas y Pecuarias (INIFAP) in the same 
region (Smale et al. 1999; Aguirre et al. 2002; Bellon et al. 2003). The aim of that 
research (1997–2002) was to determine the possibility of improving maize productivity 
while maintaining genetic diversity. This paper increases the scope of the 1997 study by 
examining the social arrangements that shape the seed and information flows on which 
farmers depend.  
 
2.  BACKGROUND 
Seed supply is a fundamental element in agriculture—without seed, there is no 
agriculture. Unlike farmers in the developed world or commercial farmers in the 
developing world, small scale-farmers in the developing world who produce for self-
consumption usually depend mostly on themselves for seed. Informal seed systems are 
still the prevailing source of seed in developing countries and many studies have stressed 
their importance (Cromwell 1990; Almekinders et al. 1994; Wierema et al. 1994; 
Sperling et al. 1995; Friis-Hansen 1999; Thiele 1999; Almekinders and Louwaars 2000; 
Seboka and Deressa 2000; Tripp 2001). Nevertheless, relatively little is known about how 
these systems function and as stated by Seboka and Deressa (2000, p. 250): “The flow of 
seeds or farmer-to-farmer exchange of seed is a neglected area of research. There is an  
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urgent need to understand more in detail the process of farmer-to-farmer exchange of 
seed.” As several authors have pointed out, informal systems are mostly based on 
traditional social alliances and family relations, cast in the context of mutual 
interdependence and trust, often forming dynamic networks with a high degree of 
complexity (Almekinders et al. 1994, Seboka and Deressa 2000; Tripp 2000).  
An important research topic in the management and conservation of crop genetic 
resources has been the focus on seed as an important source of germplasm and the 
conservation of crop genetic diversity (Brush 1986; Boef et al. 1993; Orlove and Brush 
1996; Meng and Brush 1998; Almekinders and Boef 2000; Jarvis et al. 2000; 
Almekinders 2001; Bellon 2004). In general, studies on these aspects at the local level 
often portray small-scale farmers as the caretakers of important crop genetic resources, a 
role they fulfill by maintaining and growing diverse varieties. However, most small-scale 
farmers do not maintain crop genetic resources merely for the sake of conservation. 
Rather, it appears that many farmers give social value to local resources and make special 
use of diverse crop varieties. In many cases decisions regarding varietal choice depend on 
multiple considerations, not just on yield. As Orlove and Brush (1996) point out such 
issues can be illuminated by in-depth, qualitative studies. 
Informal seed systems are central to conserving maize genetic diversity, 
sustaining farmers' livelihoods and food security, and making small-scale agriculture a 
productive and viable option. Mexico is a center of domestication and diversity for maize 
(Matsuoka et al. 2002; Piperno and Flannery 2001; Sanchez et al. 2000a, b), and small-
scale farmers continue to play a key role in the maintenance of this diversity (Bellon 
2004; Hernandez 1985; Perales et al. 2003). The structure and evolution of maize genetic  
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diversity depend on farmers’ access to a diverse array of farmer varieties. This in turn 
derives from the informal flow of varieties and seeds among households and communities 
(Bellon et al. 1997; Louette et al. 1997). An estimated 80% of the area planted to maize 
in Mexico is under seed selected from the previous harvest by farmers (Morris and López 
Pereira 1999), and thereby part of informal seed systems. To address the growing concern 
for the loss of crop genetic diversity and the importance of conserving genetic resources 
in situ, we need to know more about these systems. (Bellon 2004).  
 
3.  STUDY SITES AND METHODOLOGY 
The study was carried out in six communities in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca: 
San Pablo Huitzo, Santo Tomás Mazaltepec, San Lorenzo Albarradas, San Agustín 
Amatengo, and Santa Ana Zegache. Yearly mean temperature in the region is 18-22 °C, 
with an average annual precipitation of 600–1,000 mm (INEGI 2001a). The rainy season 
runs from May to October. Maize, beans, and squash are the common crops and average 
farm size in the study area is 3.5 ha (Smale et al. 1999). Farming systems in all six 
communities are characterized by low productivity (Smale et al. 1999).  
The state of Oaxaca is divided into districts and municipalities. Five of the six 
communities constitute municipalities headed by a municipal president and a body of 
counselors. One community, Valdeflores, has the status of agencia—an administrative 
unit below the municipality level—and belongs to the municipality of Zimatlan. All six 
communities have electricity and potable water, some medical services, and a primary 
school. San Pablo Huitzo, Valdeflores, San Agustin Amatengo and Santo Tomás  
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Mazaltepec have secondary schools, and Santa Ana Zegache and San Lorenzo Albarradas 
each have a national secondary school program via television. 
The population in the study area is predominantly Spanish-speaking, but in Santa 
Ana Zegache and Santo Tomás Mazaltepec much of the population (>30%) belongs to 
the Zapotec ethnic group and speaks Zapotec as a first language, although in both 
communities almost all Zapotec speakers also speak Spanish (only 1.3% and 0.9% 
respectively do not; INEGI 2001b).  
Maize is the major crop, being sown on 3.0 ha of the average 3.5 ha holding 
(Table 1).   
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Table 1--Key characteristics of the six studied communities  





















Good Poor  Poor  Poor  Good  Good 
- mean – 
Farm size 1996 
(ha) 
2.44+ 3.91  4.01  2.84+  3.87  3.46 
Maize area (ha)  1.99+  3.65  3.02  2.76+  3.55  3.22 
% maize area in 
improved seed 
0.14* 0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.01 
% maize area 
irrigated 
54.2* 15.7  8.10  11.90  3.78+  0.17+ 
% land privately 
owned  
49.60* 0.00  1.00  27.42*  0.00  100* 
- percent - 
Households 
dependent on local 
agricultural 
production 
70*  100 95  98 85* 100 
Households 
dependent on local 
non-farm income 




3* 13*  23*  38  25  25 
Source: Smale et al. (1999)  
Note:   * Mean (frequency) significantly higher (different) using one-tailed t-test (chi-squared 
test), .05 
significance level.  
+ Mean significantly lower using one-tailed t-test .05 significance level.  
§ Communities where the seed flow tracer study took place 
 
Farm sizes and maize area are smaller in Huitzo and Amatengo than in the other 
communities. Maize landraces dominate local agriculture: area planted to improved 
maize seed was significantly different from zero only in Huitzo, which was also the 
community with the highest average percentage of irrigated maize. Land tenure 
arrangements differ notably among communities. All farmland is privately owned in 
Santa Ana Zegache, whereas almost none is privately owned in Valdeflores, Mazaltepec, 
or San Lorenzo. In Huitzo, privately owned land represents on average about half of the  
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land farmed by households, and in Amatengo it represents about one quarter. Agriculture 
is the major source of income for nearly all households, whether located in better or 
poorer maize production zones. Non-farm employment is an important source of income 
for about one-quarter of the farmers. A similar overall percentage of households depends 
on remittances, although there are differences, particularly in Huitzo and Mazaltepec.  
Because the CIMMYT/INFAP project was conducted in the same area, 
background information on all six communities was already available. The locations were 
selected for the contrasts they represented in maize yield potential and dependency on 
non-farm income (Smale et al. 1999). The information from the previous study 
(particularly a random sample of 240 households) was used to select the informants for 
this study, who in turn represented different social groups in terms of gender, age, 
ethnicity, economic status, and level of formal education. The research employed both 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, including:  
•  In-depth, semi-structured ethnographic interviews with key informants to identify 
relevant issues and questions. This was fundamental because many issues are 
embedded in people's minds, practices, and institutions, and are not easily 
articulated by farmers, without some prior knowledge on the part of researchers 
that allows the identification and proper framing of effective questions.  
•  A series of focus group discussions in which the questions identified in the 
previous step were posed to groups of farmers, resulting in an inventory of 
responses on issues such as ways to acquire seed, reasons for doing so, social 
relations in seed transactions, and sources of information on the seed, among 
others.  
•  A quantitative tracer study of seed flows between farm households, based on all 
the information obtained in the previous two steps.  
 
The patterns that were identified by the key informants were later confirmed by 
the focus groups and the tracer study. The three methods complemented each other and 
allowed key issues to be addressed from several angles.   
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The ethnographic interviews were conducted with 22 key informants from the 
three most contrasting of the six study communities: Santa Ana Zegache, San Lorenzo 
Albarradas and San Pablo Huitzo. This activity was carried out in these three 
communities only because of the labor intensive and time consuming character of the 
methodology, and because we preferred to focus our efforts on the communities with the 
most contrasting conditions of the six. In doing so we were able to get high quality 
information that sampled the range of situations present in the study area. The key 
informants were carefully selected based on our prior knowledge to represent contrasting 
socioeconomic and ethnic conditions. 
There were 12 focus groups—one each for men and women in each of the 6 
communities—involving 46 women and 58 men in all. The discussions covered the 
relative importance of seed loss among vulnerability factors that farmers face and the 
mechanisms that guided seed transactions. Participants also acted out seed exchanges. 
Focus group results were remarkably similar across communities and gender. The focus 
group discussions were carried out in all communities because they were easy and 
inexpensive to do, but they provided a great amount of valuable information. 
The survey-based seed flow tracer study involved male and female representatives 
from 153 farm households in the same three communities where the ethnographic 
interviews were conducted.
6 We focused again on these three communities because the 
tracer study was very labor intensive and expensive. Furthermore, the results of the focus 
group discussions suggested that the conditions of these communities were representative 
of the all six.  In the tracer study, we followed the flows of seed among selected farm 
                                                 
6 The results of the focus group discussions provided further support for the impression that conditions in 
these communities fairly represented the diversity of conditions existing in all six.  
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households, included farmers’ explanations about the transactions: why they had engaged 
in a transaction, with whom, and what was the significance of the transaction, among 
other factors. For 531 transactions we mapped incoming and outgoing flows, recording 
type of transaction and the social relations involved. As starting points, 10 households in 
each community were selected using criteria similar to those described for the selection 
of informants, hence this was not a random sampling. After a first round of interviews, 
the information gathered about other households that gave or received seed was used to 
include these households in a second tier of interviews, and so on until each household 
originally interviewed had led to an average of four additional households being covered. 
Because the samples were not random or independent, we present the data simply in 
descriptive form, with no statistical analyses.  
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
Saving seed from one’s own harvest is the normal practice in the study area. 
Previous research in the area showed that 89.7% of all seed lots were saved by farmers 
from their own previous harvest, and the rest were acquired from other farmers (Smale et 
al. 1999).  
REASONS FOR SAVING SEED FROM ONE’S OWN HARVEST 
All farmers in the study area select maize seed from their previous harvests and 
save it carefully for sowing the following season. The reasons for saving seed are 




First and foremost is trust in one's own seed. Farmers value multiple crop traits 
and require varieties with different combinations of them, depending on their needs and 
constraints. For example, whereas most produce for self-consumption, some sell grain, 
others sell maize products, and others use maize to feed animals. Some farm on flat, 
fertile areas, while others grow maize on steep hills with shallow, infertile soils. 
Furthermore, farmers strongly believe that a maize variety that performs well under 
certain conditions will not likely do so under different ones. In other words, in their 
experience varieties exhibit what breeders call a high "genotype-by-environment 
interaction."  
The above circumstances are reflected in seed selection. Farmers choose maize 
seed according to criteria or characteristics that they perceive as favorable for their 
particular needs, and they also know the performance of the plants from which the seed 
comes. Given the diverse social, cultural, and environmental conditions, a variety that 
may be appropriate for one farmer is not necessarily appropriate for another. Hence, the 
best option is the seed she selects and knows. 
Two other important factors are security and cash savings. During fieldwork all 
informants seemed to share the view that saving seed provides a sense of security. Once 
the seed is selected and safely set aside, one can rest assured knowing that the seed for 
the next planting season will be available when needed, avoiding costly and yield-
reducing delays in planting. Having saved seed also means not having to spend money or 
time acquiring seed at the last moment before planting when prices typically rise and 
many small-scale farm households are struggling to raise money for land preparation, 
planting, and other operations.   
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Saving seed is also strongly associated with the social norm of being a “good 
farmer.” A good farmer is one that takes good care of her seed, and is expected to make 
every effort not to lose her seed. As the female farmers in one focus group explained it: “ 
[losing seed]… is like hurting one’s pride in being a good farmer – it is like a 
humiliation.” It is legitimate however, for a farmer to obtain seed from other farmers in a 
bad year, provided he has followed the norm of “taking good care” of the seed. In this 
case, the person is someone who has a justifiable need for the seed and the donor is also 
assured that he will “take good care” of it. The recipient “deserves” the seed and will 
appreciate the favor, being someone who normally tries to select and keep his seed from 
the previous harvest, and therefore does not habitually rely on others for seed. This norm 
may also serve to discourage free riders, who frequently request seed from others but are 
incapable of serving as seed providers when the need arises.  However, because the 
definition of a “good farmer” is somewhat ambiguous, the set of farmers who exchange 
seed is not a clearly defined group or club, but rather a “fuzzy club.” 
Finally, farmers admit to feeling affection for their own seed. The seed may be an 
inheritance, passed from parents to children when the latter start farming independently. 
Usually, the seed is given to a young couple by the husband’s parents. In some cases, 
however, they may receive the seed from both sets of parents or, in special cases, only 
from the wife’s.
7 Often, the seed may have been in the family for many years, being seen 
as contributing significantly to its sustenance, and thus being revered or attributed with 
symbolic value beyond its immediate utility in the farming system. For many small-scale 
                                                 
7 In the cases we know, this occurred either because the husband did not have relatives in the community, 
relatives had no seed to give, or there were bad relations between the couple and the husband’s family. 
The case of Lucio and Felicitas is an example of the latter. Lucio’s parents did not want to acknowledge 
the marriage between the two. They did not offer seed to the young couple, who on the other hand did not 
want to ask for it. Instead they received seed for their first maize crop from Felicitas' parents.   
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farmers in the Central Valleys, their maize seed lot is an heirloom linking them to 
forebears and which they, in turn, will pass on to future generations. Saving seed, 
therefore, becomes a way of conserving and honoring important traditions and family 
ties. 
REASON FOR ACQUIRING SEED FROM OTHER SUPPLIERS 
Only 24.2% and 20.9% of the farmers in the tracer study engaged in seed 
acquisitions or distributions respectively in 2001. Focus group discussions and in-depth 
interviews with key informants identified many reasons for seed exchanges. These were 
quantified during the tracer study and divided into four themes: (1) establishing a new 
farm household, (2) lack of sufficient seed for planting, (3) experimentation, and (4) 




Table 2--Reasons for acquiring maize seed 
Theme  Total number of recorded seed acquisitions  317 
  Reasons for acquiring seed (% of acquisitions)   
Establishing a household  Establishing a household  27.8 
    
Lack of sufficient seed  Complete seed loss  5.4 
  Did not save seed from last year  4.7 
  Partial seed loss  3.8 
 Harvest  loss  3.8 
  Sold it all  0.6 
  Seed loss due to pests in storage  0.6 
 For  replanting  0.3 
 Subtotal  19.2 
    
Experimentation  Liked the seed  26.5 
  “To see if it works”  4.1 
 
Bought grain for consumption, but so nice they 
selected seed from that  1.6 
 Subtotal  32.2 
    
Others’ Initiative  Someone else asked for a seed exchange  2.2 
  Someone brought the seed as a present  3.2 
 Subtotal  5.4 
    
 Other  15.5 
 
 
As stated previously, when people establish independent households they usually 
get seed from parents. 
A lack of seed in a household may be due to partial loss from low yields or total 
loss from drought, water logging, insect attack, weeds, hail, or poor management. Seed 
may also be lost in storage to insects or rodents. Farmers may be forced to sell or 
consume their entire harvest in the case of an emergency (sickness, an accident, other 
problems). Farmers who produce maize for fodder may harvest before seed is produced.   
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Seed loss can be partial or complete. The former, which is the most common case, 
normally results in mixtures of seed being sown, through farmers complementing the 
seed they lack with relatively small amounts of additional seed. In the latter case, 
complete substitution of the former variety can occur. People, who for some reason, e.g. 
temporary migration, decide not to plant maize for some time, often face a similar 
situation due to the relatively fast decline in maize seed germination rate and vigor 
(Morris 1998).  
It is interesting to note the relatively low number of acquisitions reported as 
addressing seed loss. There is a social stigma associated with seed loss, even though in 
most circumstances it may be beyond farmers’ control. Still, in line with the “good 
farmer” notion described above, informants said that seed loss can be associated with 
laziness, lack of knowledge, and inappropriate practices. Never having lost one’s seed is 
a source of pride for farmers, who would naturally be reluctant to talk about occasions 
when they may have lost their seed. It is possible, for example, that informants in the 
tracer study who said they had acquired seed simply because they really liked it may also 
have had a serious need for it, and otherwise might not have sought it in the first place.  
Like farmers elsewhere, many small-scale farmers in the Central Valleys are 
curious and want to try new options. They may believe that other farmers' maize varieties 
seldom work for them, but are also on the lookout for worthwhile traits or advantages in 
varieties grown by peers. Furthermore, they also recognize that “foreign” seed can 
eventually become adapted to local conditions,
8 if planted and selected under those 
conditions. This leads to many instances in which farmers try out other materials or 
                                                 
8 The term “creolization” or rustication—applied elsewhere in Mexico to denote a loss of improved traits in 
improved varieties—can actually name the process by which farmers adapt “foreign” varieties, improved or 
otherwise, to local conditions (Bellon and Risopoulos 2001).  
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combine or cross them with their own materials to see what happens. On occasion 
farmers actively seek maize with specific characteristics they would like to incorporate 
into their own maize. Others will look for seed more generally in the hope of obtaining a 
kind of maize that is particularly good for special uses or dishes. They may eventually 
decide to incorporate such acquisitions into their own permanent collections of maize 
populations. To minimize risk, farmers usually experiment with small amounts of seed or 
on small plots. It should be pointed out that this is the largest category. Furthermore, if 
one excludes the category of seed acquired to establish a new household, experimentation 
accounts for 44.5% of seed acquisitions, compared to only 26.7% for the category “lack 
of sufficient seed.”  
Farmers can get seed from other farmers without actively seeking it, in cases 
where another farmer requests a seed-for-seed exchange or where the seed is a gift. The 
receiving farmer may eventually decide to plant the seed. The sister of one of our 
informants brings small amounts of maize seed from her own maize field every year 
when she visits him. Our informant, who plants this seed, says that he regards it as a 
token of the affection between his sister and himself and as a way to stay close, in spite of 
the distance that separates them. In any case, these reasons for acquiring seed are 
relatively infrequent. 
According to the tracer study, the amounts of seed involved in farmer-to-farmer 
transactions are often quite small (Table 3). For many transactions, the exact quantity was 
unknown, but nearly half the rest involved only 8 kg—enough to sow 0.5 ha—or less. 
Plots in the Central Valleys are generally small and require relatively little seed, but the 
frequency of small seed transactions suggests experimentation or partial seed loss as the  
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most common reasons for acquiring seed. This bears out findings by the 
CIMMYT/INIFAP project conducted prior to the work described here (Aguirre et al. 
2002). It is also consistent with the view that farmers' main source of seed is their own 
fields. Seed flows among farmers occur at the margins of this practice.  
 
Table 3--Quantity of seed involved in transactions 
Total number of transactions
a 421 
 
















41-100  4.8 
 
>101 1.2 
aNo data for 110 transactions 
 
 
REASONS TO PROVIDE SEED TO OTHER FARMERS 
The tracer study records two main reasons for farmers giving seed to others: (1) 
social responsibility or (2) to obtain something in return, e.g. money or seed (Table 4). In 
another paper (Badstue et al. 2003), we have argued that access to seed in the study area 
may be understood as stemming in part from a general sense of social responsibility. This 
is confirmed by the current results, showing that the reasons stated for most of the 
distributions registered have to do with helping the recipient. In particular, the idea that if  
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a fellow farmer asks for seed and one has sufficient seed, one cannot deny it. As stated by 
various informants: “I provided him the seed because I had it!”  
 
Table 4--Reasons for distributing seed 
  Total number of distributions  195 
Theme  Reasons for distributing seed (% of distributions)   
Social obligations   




A seed interchange was asked for 
3.1 
  
A barter was solicited 
1.0 
  











    
Obtain something in    
Needed to obtain money 
5.6 
return  
Sell seed and/or grain  
11.8 
  
To obtain seed 
1.0 
  





    
 Others  4.6 
 
 
Most farmers who provided seed received something, either cash or seed, in 
return. However, the fundamental motivation was their sense of social obligation, rather 
than to make a profit, and what they received was in fact simply fair compensation that 
allowed them to break even in the transaction. Having said this, in 17.4% of the  
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transactions, the seed providers sought and obtained a profit. Most of the seed-for-profit 
transactions were associated with two persons who are known to sell seed every year.  
These findings suggest strong cultural values associated with being helpful to 
others. People who are not willing to provide seed to others are considered selfish. In 
interviews with key informants, an important motivation for many seed providers is that 
the person requesting the seed has a genuine need for it. Finally, a general sense of 
reciprocity, rather than a specific obligation to particular individuals, was mentioned, as 
in the words of one informant: “What goes around, comes around.”  
DIFFERENT TYPES OF SEED TRANSACTIONS  
Informants described different types of seed transactions in detail during 
ethnographic interviews and focus group discussions. Quantitative data on seed 
transactions were later gathered in the seed flow tracer study. Transactions were 
classified in seven categories, including “other” which referred to infrequent, ad hoc 
transactions (Table 5).  
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Table 5--Types and number of seed transactions  
Transactions Acquisition Distribution Type of 
transaction 
Description 
# % # % # % 
Purchase  Seed that has been bought and paid for 
in cash 
 
280 52,7 143 42,7 137 69,9 
Inheritance  When parents or foster parents pass on 
maize seed to their children or foster 
children. This can be when the parents 
die, or when the children become 
independent of their parents and start 
to farm on their own 
 
89 16,8 84  25,1 5  2,5 
Exchange  Seed of one kind of maize is 
exchanged for the same quantity of 
seed of another kind of maize. 
Sometimes seed is acquired in 
exchange for grain, but quantities 
normally vary, as seed has higher value 
than grain 
 
52 9,8 37  11,0  15 7,7 
Gift  In this transaction seed is provided 
without payment whether monetary or 
in kind 
 
49 9,2 32 9,6 17 8,7 
Barter  This is an exchange in kind, i.e. maize 
seed for some other good, which is of 
use to the seed provider (e.g., beans or 
coffee) 
 
7 1,3 4 1,2 3 1,5 
Borrowed  The seed provider hands over the seed 
to the person requesting it, with the 
latter in turn promising to give back the 
same quantity of seed of the same kind 
of maize once it has been harvested  
 
3  0,6  - - 3  1,5 
Other  This category contains various other 
ways of obtaining seed: 
sharecropping
1, pepena
2, seed won in a 
lottery, payment realized in kind with 
maize, and seed acquired without the 
knowledge of the seed provider  
 
51 9,6 35  10,4  16 8,2 
Total  531 100% 335 100% 196 100%
1 In this arrangement the owner of the land contributes the plot of land and the seed while the other 
contributes the labor. When the harvest is over, they split the harvest (in most cases equally) between the 
two of them. 




The quantitative data clearly show the heterogeneity of transactions, although 
purchases account for half. Focus group discussions and informant interviews provided 
detail on the many types of transactions and their individual variations. We had expected 
a relatively uniform and clearly defined mode of transaction, reflecting adherence to a set 
of rights and responsibilities and a system of collective action. This was not what was 
found. Furthermore, while most informants remembered from whom they had obtained 
seed in the recent past, many had difficulty recalling to whom they had given seed. This 
can explain the noticeable discrepancy between the number of acquisitions and 
distributions. 
Most seed transactions carry no obligation beyond the immediate transaction, 
except for borrowed seed or that given as a gift. The borrower must repay the seed, 
sometimes but not always including interest, and gifts usually carry an implicit obligation 
to return the favor. 
SOCIAL RELATIONS 
The in-depth interviews and focus group discussions brought to light categories of 
social relations frequently involved in seed transactions (Table 6). These were later 
quantified in the tracer study. The "seed provider" categories mentioned here do not 
constitute an exhaustive list. Each category could also be sub-divided, and subcategories 
will overlap and show variations among them. For example, neighbors can sometimes 
also be relatives or compadres.
9 This grouping reflects the informants’ own 
                                                 
9 From the word compadrazgo, referring to a ritual kinship, somewhat similar to the relation known elsewhere as 
godparents, through which close relations of loyalty, mutual help, reciprocity, and confidence are established and 
formalized. Often there is a certain degree of prestige associated with being asked to become someone’s compadre or 




classifications; that is, an informant referred to a seed provider as an "uncle," the provider 
was classified as family member, though the person might also be a neighbor.  
 
Table 6--Transactions per type of seed providers 




# % # % # % 
Family 
members 
This group includes blood relatives as 
well as affiliated relatives 
 
247 46,5  177  52,8 70 35,7 
Compadres  Very close relations, considered 
almost like family. When asked for 
help they cannot easily refuse (Beals 
1970) 
 
25 4,7 13 3,9 12 6,1 
Neighbors  Neighbors. It should be noted that 
neighbors often also are relatives or 
compadres 
 
7 1,3 5 1,5 2 1,0 
Friends  Include workmates and people who 
belong to the same social 
organizations, church group, or 
communal work group. Their role is 
significant both as a source of 
information and in terms of exchange 
or mutual help 
 
38 7,2 22 6,6 16 8.2 
Acquaintances  This group includes sharecropper 
relations and owners of neighboring 
fields, plus other persons people 
know, but with whom they do not 
have close social ties 
  
157 29,6 70 20,9 87 44,4 
Strangers  Persons of whom nothing or very little 
is known. With strangers seed is 
usually sold for cash, as no relation of 
trust or familiarity exists 
 
19 3,6  18  5,4 1 0,5 
Others  Includes commercial seed vendors, 
shopkeepers, government or NGO 
programs etc 
 
38 7,2  30  8,9 8 4,1 




People obtain seed through many types of social relationships. Family members 
and acquaintances are the most common. Most seed transactions took place between 
people who already knew each other and who shared a feeling of mutual obligation. 
Informants in focus group discussions and ethnographic interviews were not able to 
identify specific persons as particular seed-relations (except for researchers involved in 
the CIMMYT/INIFAP project that included a seed distribution activity). The data 
regarding social relations does not provide evidence of farmers’ involvement in 
specialized institutions for the mutual supply of seed.  
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SOCIAL RELATIONS AND SEED TRANSACTIONS 
Trust in general is important for these farmers. Trust in the seed may often derive 
from a relationship of trust between the recipient and the provider. There is a slight 
association between transaction type and supplier-recipient relationship (Table 7). 
Inheritance or, less frequently, gifts are the most common transactions among kin, 
whereas purchases predominate among acquaintances and strangers. Gifts are nonexistent 
among acquaintances and strangers. Purchases, on the other hand, constituted a frequent 
type of transaction in all cases. Informants also said that, in barter and exchange among 
acquaintances and strangers, quantities were calculated based on market prices, but rates 
in transactions with kin or a close relationship might be more favorable. Clearly no 
particular type of transaction is restricted to a single category of seed supplier. Closeness 
of social relationship improves chances of preferential treatment, but does not determine 
type of transaction—consistent with Sahlins’ (1972) findings on primitive exchange. 
Most transactions involve a feeling of trust between provider and recipient, either through 
consanguineous or affiliative kinship, compadrazgo, or friendship.   
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Table7--Types of transactions by groups of seed providers. 
Seed provider’s 
social relation 
to seed receiver 















34 (61 %)  12 (21 %)  7 (13 %)  3 (5 %)  56 (100%) 
People the seed 
receiver knows 
 
126 (75 %)  10 (6 %)  26 (16 %)  5 (3 %)  167 (100%) 
Strangers 
 
30 (86 %)  3 (9 %)  3 (6 %)  0 ( - )  36 (100%) 
Total 280  52  61  138  531  (100%) 
1. Here both consanguineous and affiliative kinship as well as compadrazgo. 
 
Both in interviews and focus group discussions, informants emphasized that seed 
must be both of good quality and appropriate for target production conditions and 
preferences. Some seed seekers also take into consideration the way the seed has been 
cultivated and what they know about the general quality of a supplier's work. These 
complex requirements make it difficult for those seeking seed to obtain appropriate 
information. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of an accepted and clearly defined 
nomenclature for local maize varieties, beyond broad categories such as grain color and 
width and growing cycle, as described in previous research in the area (Smale et al. 1999) 
and confirmed by both Zapotec and Spanish speaking farmers in the present study.  
The easiest source of knowledge and trustworthy information, not surprisingly, is 
the people with whom the farmer already has close social relations. Farmers may already 
know the characteristics of varieties used by kin or close friends, and can easily obtain 
more information. Conversations with family members, compadres, and neighbors, as 
well as paying attention to what other farmers were growing, were among the most 
frequently reported ways of obtaining information about seed used elsewhere in the  
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community. Acquiring seed from trusted sources reduces the risk of obtaining 
inappropriate seed. Similarly, seed transactions can occur through many types of social 
relationship, so farmers are not dependent on a single supplier.  
FREQUENCIES OF SEED TRANSACTIONS 
It is difficult to assess the frequency of seed transactions; farmers do not keep 
records of such transactions, so estimates must rely on the memories of those 
interviewed. In the tracer study, seed transactions involving current cultivars were 
carefully registered, noting the year they took place and allowing farmers to go as far 
back in time as desired. Recent transactions are more likely to be remembered than those 
from a long time ago. Notwithstanding these limitations, an estimate of the frequency of 
seed transactions was calculated. Table 8 shows the average number of transactions per 
farmer for the three most recent years. The distribution between acquisitions and 
instances of providing seed is approximately the same, meaning that on average 
acquisitions occur 0.31 times every year and provisions occur and 0.39 times a year—in 
both cases, approximately once every three years. Furthermore, only 24.2% (acquisition) 
and 20.9% (provision) of the farmers engaged in seed transactions in 2001, according to 
tracer study data. Seed transactions are apparently infrequent and do not involve a large 
number of farmers every year.   
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Table 8--Frequencies of acquisitions and distributions per year per farmer across 
most recent years. 
Year 
Average number of 
acquisitions/farmer/ year 
Average number of 
acquisitions/farmer/ year 
 
2001 0.31  0.39 
2000 0.25  0.30 
1999 0.23  0.24 
 
 
GENETIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEED SYSTEM 
Farmers in the study area maintain diverse maize landraces and thereby contribute 
to the conservation of maize genetic diversity (Bellon et al. 2003; Smale et al. 2003). 
Research using neutral markers
10 has shown no genetic structure for landrace populations 
collected in the study villages, but analysis based on phenotypic traits shows strong 
structure associated with farmers and communities (Pressoir and Berthaud 2003). By 
definition neutral markers are not under selection; they provide information on the 
evolutionary history of a population (migration, bottlenecks, drift). The fact that no 
structure was found indicates that migration (gene flow) among these populations has 
been strong enough to compensate for the effects of bottlenecks and drift. On the other 
hand, phenotypic traits of varieties collected from the same farmer or same community 
are more similar in their characteristics—mainly ear and grain traits—than those 
collected from other farmers or other villages. This indicates that human selection is 
playing a key role in creating and maintaining different types of maize, and hence 
phenotypic diversity. Furthermore, experiments with these landraces have shown that 
they contain high rates of deleterious mutations. Such mutations are expressed in 
homozygous plants. Gene flow promotes heterozygous plants, hence mitigating the 
                                                 
10 Variation in DNA that can be detected and that is not necessarily translated into a selective advantage.  
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expression of the deleterious mutations, a phenomenon that has been called “genetic 
rescue” (Keller and Waller 2002). Gene flow therefore seems to be playing an important 
role in preserving the viability of these landraces for farmers. 
Definitions of "type" or "variety" based on molecular analyses of the diversity of 
maize samples from two farmers over time—including both a creolized variety derived 
from a hybrid and a landrace—differed from the farmers' own definitions (Ramirez, in 
preparation) The farmers said the landrace and the creolized variety were the same, but 
genetic analyses showed them to be quite different and that the level of genetic diversity 
changed over time. For example, molecular analyses comparisons of seed of the creolized 
variety with that of the original hybrid showed them to be completely different. This 
suggests that the farmers did not report or pay attention to changes in the variety over 
time, and illustrates the difficulties of linking what farmers tell us about the maize 
populations they grow with their actual genetic identity. It also demonstrates the dynamic 
nature of seed exchanges in the study area, a level of seed flow that farmers may 
underestimate. 
These results corroborate our other observations on farmers' seed exchange 
practices. First, the practice of selecting and saving one's own seed is the basis of the 
phenotypic diversity and the seed exchange "system" in the study area. One could say 
that each farmer creates and maintains her own, almost unique maize varieties. Second, 
gene flow is an important way in which farmers add new traits, modify varieties to fit 
their needs, and keep their varieties "healthy"—that is, maintain viability in the face of 
deleterious mutations. Gene flow most commonly occurs when farmers experiment with 
“foreign” seed, mixing new varieties with their own to creolize them. Current seed  
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practices allow farmers to experiment and incorporate new varieties into their collections, 
while conserving varietal traits suited to their needs and environments. The system is 
very dynamic, which complicates its analysis, particularly since farmers may 
underestimate the changes that take place in their varieties. 
 
5.  DISCUSSION 
The hypothesized existence of specialized collective action for maintaining access 
to seed of diverse maize landraces, in terms of a well-defined group of farmers linked by 
a set of rights and responsibilities in relation to the mutual supply of seed, led to a series 
of predictions. The results showed that the predictions were not fulfilled. First, although 
seed transactions occur within a set of social relations, one would have expected 
informants to be able to name particular people whom they rely upon to get seed 
recurrently, which they did not. In many cases, they had trouble remembering the people 
with whom they had had transactions. Second, there were many different types of seed 
transactions. Transaction type can vary even under similar circumstances, and 
transactions are bilateral, whereas a specialized and organized collective action scenario 
would involve a set of well defined practices and a distinct group of farmers. Third, most 
transactions do not involve any long-term obligation between supplier and recipient. The 
seed supplier-recipient relationship usually ends with the completion of the transaction.   
There are, however, general cultural norms regulating the circumstances under 
which it is appropriate to ask for seed, whom to ask, and to whom one should provide 
seed. In particular, those who are considered “good farmers”, because they take care of 
their seed, are often asked for seed and may ask for seed from others, particularly if they  
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have lost theirs through no fault of their own.  However, the definition of a “good farmer” 
is somewhat ambiguous.  Thus, the set of farmers who exchange seed is not a clearly 
defined group or club, but rather a “fuzzy club.” 
Part of the rationale for the original hypothesis relied on an assumption that seed 
loss was the principal driving force behind seed transactions. The results showed that this 
is not the case and that a more important driver is farmers’ experimentation. Clearly 
experimentation is a form of managing risk to acquire information, but it is related with 
curiosity and the search for new maize types that fit farmers’ needs. More importantly, 
the data show that seed transactions are infrequent, so the fixed cost of a specialized 
organization to access seed may be larger than the cost savings for individual 
transactions, meaning that it would not be worthwhile.  
When farmers occasionally do obtain seed from other farmers, it is mainly from 
close social relations. There are good reasons for this. The cost of obtaining information 
on different varieties and availability of seed should be relatively low, given that seed can 
be obtained as part of normal, frequent social interaction. The social ties give rise to trust 
and confidence that the seed has the desired characteristics and quality. At the same time, 
farmers often have first-hand knowledge of the varieties grown by their relatives or 
friends. If the variety is grown in the same community under conditions similar to those 
in the farmer’s own fields, uncertainty related to environmental adaptation is reduced. 
Finally, obtaining seed from a close social relation can often secure preferential treatment 
in the transaction. Even though obtaining seed from close social relations has many 
advantages, farmers still do get seed from people outside their family circle, particularly 
through purchase. Close social relations are an important but not exclusive source of seed  
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for farmers. This emphasizes the flexible and sometimes ad hoc nature of seed 
transactions among farmers. 
Farmers generally save seed from one crop cycle to the next. The need to acquire 
new seed is therefore occasional, rather than constant or recurrent. The incentives for 
specialized and organized collective action may be low, because the fixed costs may 
exceed benefits, given the relatively low frequency of acquiring seed off-farm. Access to 
seed from other farmers is instead part of a more general social responsibility for mutual 
assistance. Social networks and factors such as loyalty, mutual help, reciprocity, 
confidence and feelings of social obligation that can be interpreted as aspects of social 
capital, are central to seed flows among farmers. For example, "friends"—meaning 
people who belong to the same social organizations, church groups and communal work 
group—is the third most frequent type of participants in seed transactions after family 
and compadres, and their relative order relates directly to their social capital component. 
Although there is no formal organization to handle seed transactions, seed flows between 
friends show that social capital and collective action for purposes others than seed 
exchanges are used to gain information on seed and undertake actual transactions. Other 
studies have shown that collective action for unrelated activities influences the ability to 
cooperate in a different activity (e.g. McCarthy et al. 2004). In our case, social capital (in 
family and compadres categories) and collective action (friend category) in other spheres 
provide "cheap" information and reciprocity for seed exchanges. So social networks as 
well as collective action in other spheres (friend category) are exploited for seed 
exchanges. In particular the infrequency of seed transactions helps explain the absence of  
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specialized collection action for seed exchanges and the reliance instead on existing 
social networks and collective action in other spheres. 
The definition of "specialized and organized collective action" used here is quite 
restrictive: it is confined to formal organizations with very strict group membership with 
the sole purpose of supporting seed flows. Consider however more informal institutions 
with rules that are not predetermined and that adjust to contingencies. These rules are 
'fuzzy' and more difficult to identify, but are also more flexible and better suited to deal 
with risk and uncertainty (for example, crop failure, storage problems) and relatively rare 
exchanges. Add to this the desire to experiment. Under these circumstances, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that some degree of collective action has at least a secondary role 
in seed exchange systems. Even the fact that farmers rely on different sources of seed 
might not indicate a complete absence of collective action, but might be a way to reduce 
the risk of crop failure and maintain the freedom to experiment and respond to changing 
and relatively infrequent seed needs. 
Our research showed that the core principle of the seed "system" in the study 
communities is farmers’ practice of selecting and saving their own seed. Seed flows 
occur when this fails or when farmers want to try other varieties. Seed flows in the study 
communities take place at the periphery of the system. The results presented here suggest 
the following organizing principles for seed exchanges. 
 
1.  The concept of the “good farmer."  
2.  The lack of transparency in the seed: one cannot know the traits and 
the performance of the plants that will grow from it, while at the same 
time these are what a farmer cares about (Morris 1998). This lack of 
information is exacerbated by the lack of a commonly recognized and  
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clearly defined local nomenclature for local maize varieties that goes 
beyond broad categories (e.g., grain color, width, growing cycle). 
3.  A demand for diversity by farmers: farmers value multiple crop traits 
and different farmers require distinct varieties based on their needs, 
preferences, and constraints. 
4.  A clear understanding of genotype-by-environment interaction: one 
size does not fit all—the main reason that farmers maintain diverse 
maize varieties (Bellon 1996). 
5.  An interest in experimentation. 
6.  A belief in the ability to modify foreign seed to suit local needs. 
 
Given 1-3, it makes perfect sense to keep one own seed. The seed is well known 
and it has the desired characteristics and performance (production, consumption 
requirements). These factors argue for very conservative behavior in farmers, when it 
comes to accessing seed. At the same time, farmers recognize that other maize varieties 
may be useful or desirable and thus like to experiment with seed from other farmers and 
believe in creolization—the ability to tailor foreign genotypes to local needs and 
preferences, if the seed is grown in the appropriate environment and selected properly. 
Foreign seeds can also be mixed with one’s own to create new, desirable combinations. 
This practice has been described for other farmers in Mexico (Aguirre 1999; Perales et al. 
2003). These factors motivate innovation and foster an interest in obtaining foreign seed, 
thereby counterbalancing the conservative behavior described above. These principles 
translate into a resilient system that is partly conservative but that can innovate as well. 
They are also consistent with the fact that seed exchanges are usually infrequent, involve 
small quantities of seed, and require trustworthy information, normally (but not always) 
from sources with whom one has close ties—family members, compadres, and neighbors.  
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Seed exchanges are not primarily commercial, but are part of a moral system based on 
trust and social responsibility.  
Our investigation based on the "specialized and organized collective action" 
hypothesis for seed exchanges helped us to discover the more informal and ‘fuzzy’ 
characteristics of the existing seed exchange system. 
 
6.  DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS  
Two meetings were carried out with local scientists, policy makers, community 
authorities and farmers to “give back” the results from the project. The meetings provided 
an opportunity to discuss these results and reflect on their implications. Many of the 
participants—particularly those involved in policy interventions—were somewhat 
surprised with the complexity of the system and, particularly, with the fact that farmers 
were not bound by some static notion of tradition. They are conservative and innovative 
at the same time and for good reason. For participants involved in government programs 
that distribute improved seed, it was an eye-opener. Their efforts had not been very 
successful, because farmers do not adopt the new varieties after testing them, possibly 
because they did not trust the "seed." Part of the problem could be the narrow view of the 
term "improved variety” in such programs. Often the primary emphasis is on grain yield, 
whereas farmers value diverse traits.  
There was a discussion about establishing community seed banks, and the idea 
was rejected by the participants. It may be more important to give farmers access to the 
maize diversity present by creating some sort of “virtual” collection with relevant 
information about who is growing what. It is not clear though how this can be done.  
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There was also another discussion about a group of women who have created a network 
to sell hand-made tortillas in the city of Oaxaca. They are creating a demand for landrace 
maize and an incipient marketing system is developing around them. Clearly, consumers 
have to be involved in the system to improve its viability. 
 
7.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
To maintain genetic diversity on-farm in this area, the integrity of the seed system 
has to be maintained. This means that farmers should be able to continue to save and 
select seed, but also to have access to other varieties that may be of interest to them. 
Hence seed flows among farmers should be sustained.  
The present system seems resilient. Relatively few farmers need or request seed 
and this means that it is relatively easy to find somebody to provide it. However, this also 
depends on having large numbers of farmers. If the farmer population declines 
substantially, the seed available for exchanges among farmers may diminish enough to 
jeopardize the maize diversity maintained in this system. 
Supporting farmers’ efforts to maintain genetic diversity on-farm may require 
external interventions that reinforce the current processes. Fostering an information-rich 
environment seems essential—farmers should know who is planting what and have 
access to relevant and trustworthy information about the varieties grown. Interventions 
that promote low-cost, low-risk access to new and interesting varieties for 
experimentation, as was done during the CIMMYT/INFAP project, could be valuable. 
Such interventions should build trust, which suggests that they should invest heavily in 
building and/or developing social capital among farmers and between farmers and the  
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outsiders promoting the interventions. One should be careful however of interventions 
that try to create specialized organizations with the sole purpose of dealing with seed 
issues and that rely exclusively on farmers' willingness to act together to maintain 
diversity; e.g., community seed banks. Based on our results, it seems unlikely that such 
set-ups would work. 
Given the way the current seed system is organized, it is unlikely that a market for 
seed will develop. Since most farmers save seed, the demand for outside seed is small. In 
this system one size does not fit all or at least a “few sizes do not fit all.” Nobody can 
make a business out of selling small amounts of many different things. Donors have 
subsidized interventions such as those practiced in the CIMMYT/INIFAP project. The 
fact that, as part of this project, farmers purchased seed of diverse maize varieties proves 
that there is a demand for seed of farmers’ varieties, but only in small quantities and for 
experimentation. Supplying such seed may not be a self-sustaining enterprise. 
The system could evolve towards more and larger quantities of seed moving 
among farmers, if the number of farmers declines and the area planted per farmer 
increases. This could represent a movement toward a more commercial system with less 
diversity. The nature of the seed system would then be changed dramatically, and 
probably diversity as we observe today will also change as well. To the extent that these 
changes result in improvements to these farmers, then they should be welcomed. The 






Aguirre Gómez, J. A. 1999. Análisis regional de la diversidad del maíz en el Sureste de 
Guanajuato. Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 
D.F. 
Aguirre, J.A., F. Aragón, M. Bellon, J. Berthaud, and M. Smale.  2002. CG Maize 
Diversity Conservation: A Farmer-scientist collaborative approach. Final 
Technical Report. CIMMYT, Mexico, D.F. 
Almekinders, C. and N. Louwaars.  2000. Farmers’ seed production. new approaches 
and practices. Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd., London, UK. 
Almekinders, C.  2001. Management of crop genetic diversity at community level. GTZ, 
Germany. 
Almekinders, C. and W. de Boef.  2000. Encouraging diversity: The conservation and 
development of plant genetic resources. Intermediate Publications Ltd., London, 
UK. 
Almekinders, C.J.M., N. P. Louwaars, and G.H. de Bruijn.  1994. Local seed systems and 
their importance for an improved seed supply in developing countries. Euphytica 
78: 207-216. 
Badstue, L., M. R. Bellon, J. Berthaud, X. Juárez, I. Manuel Rosas, A. M. Solano, and A. 
Ramírez. 2003. Social relations and seed transactions among small-scale maize 
farmers: a case study from the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico. CIMMYT 
Economics Working Paper 02-02. Mexico, D.F.: CIMMYT.  
Bellon, M. R. 1996. The dynamics of crop infraspecific diversity: A conceptual 
framework at the farmer level. Economic Botany 50: 26-39. 
Bellon, M. R. and J. Risopoulos. 2001. Small-scale farmers expand the benefits of 
improved maize germplasm: A case study from Chiapas, Mexico. World 
Development 29: 799-811. 
Bellon, M. R. 2004. Conceptualizing interventions to support on-farm genetic resource 
conservation. World Development 32 (1): 159-172.  
Bellon, M.R., J. Berthaud, M. Smale, J.A. Aguirre, S.  Taba, F. Aragón, J. Díaz,  and H. 
Castro.  2003. Participatory landrace selection for on farm conservation: An 
example from the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico. Genetic Resources and 
Crop Evolution. 50: 401-416.  
 
38
Bellon, M.R., J.L. Pham, and M.T. Jackson. 1997. Genetic conservation: A role for rice 
farmers. In Plant conservation: The in situ approach, ed. N. Maxted, B.V. Ford-
Lloyd, and J.G. Hawkes.   London: Chapman and Hall. 
Boef, W. de, Amanor, K., Wellard, K. Bebbington, A. (Eds.), 1993. Cultivating 
Knowledge. Genetic Diversity, Farmer Experimentation and Crop Research. 
Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd., London, UK. 
Brush, S.B., 1986. Genetic diversity and conservation in traditional farming systems. 
Journal of Ethnobiology 6: 151-167. 
Cordero Avendaño de Durand, C.1997. La vara de mando. Costumbre jurídica en la 
transmisión de Poderes. Biblioteca del 465 Aniversario, Oaxaca de Juárez, 
México. 
Cromwell, E. (ed.).  1990. Seed diffusion mechanisms in small farmer communities. 
Lessons from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Odi-Network Paper 21. Overseas 
Development Institute, London, UK. 
Friis-Hansen, E., 1999. The Socioeconomic dynamics of farmers’ management of local 
plant genetic resources – A framework for analysis with examples from a 
Tanzanian case study. CDR Working paper 99.3. Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Hernandez, E. 1985. Maize and the greater Southwest. Economic Botany 39: 416-430. 
INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática), 2001a. Aspectos 
Geográficos de Oaxaca. Mapa de Temperatura Media Anual. 
http://oax.inegi.gob.mx/territorio/espanol/temperat.html, last update: 29/03/2001, 
13:04.  
INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática) 2001b. XII Censo 
General de Poblacion y Vivienda. 
Http://www.inegi.gob.mx/difusion/espanol/poblacion/definitivos/oax/tabulados/o
cot/25le01.pdf, last update 02/12/2002, 16:00.   
Jarvis, D.I., Myer, L., Klemick, H., Guarino, L., Smale, M., Brown, A.H.D., Sadiki, M. 
Sthapit, B., Hodgkin, T., 2000. Enhancing the benefits for farmers from local crop 
diversity. In: A Training guide for in situ conservation on Farm. Version 1.  
Rome: International Plant Genetic Resources Institute.  
Keller, L.F., Waller, D.M. 2002. Inbreeding effects on wild populations. Trends in 
Ecology and Evolution. 17(5): 230-241. 
Knox, A., Meinzen-Dick, R., Hazell, P., 1998. Property rights, collective action and 
technologies for natural resource management: A conceptual framework. System-
wide Program on Property Rights and Collective Action Working Paper 1. 
http://www.capri.cgiar.org/pdf/capriwp01.pdf   
 
39
Louette, D., Charrier, A. and Berthaud, J. 1997. In situ conservation of maize in Mexico: 
Genetic diversity and maize seed management in a traditional community. 
Economic Botany 51: 20-38. 
Matsuoka, Y. Y. Vigouroux, M. M. Goodman, J. Sanchez G. E. Buckler & J. Doebley. 
2002. A single domestication for maize shown by multilocus microsatellite 
genotyping. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99:6080-6084. 
McCarthy, N., C. Dutilly-Diané and B. Drabo. 2004. Cooperation, collective action and 
natural resources management in Burkina Faso. Agricultural Systems 82: 233–
255. 
Meng, E., Brush, S.B. 1998. Farmers’ valuation and conservation of crop genetic 
resources. Genetic Resources and Crop Evolution 45: 139-150. 
Morris, M. L. (ed.).1998. Maize seed industries in developing countries. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder, Colorado.  
Morris, M. and Lopez-Pereira, M. A. 1999. Impacts of maize breeding research in Latin 
America 1966-1997. Mexico, D.F.: CIMMYT. 
Orlove, B.S., Brush, S.B., 1996. Anthropology and the conservation of biodiversity. 
Annual Review of Anthropology 25: 329-52. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, USA. 
Perales-Rivera, H. R. Brush, S. B. and Qualset, C. 2003. Dynamic management of maize 
landraces in central Mexico. Economic Botany 57, 21-34. 
Piperno, D.R. and K.V. Flannery. 2001. The earliest archaeological maize (Zea mays L.) 
from highland Mexico: New accelerator mass spectrometry dates and their 
implications. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98: 2101-2103. 
Pressoir, G., Berthaud, J., 2003 Population structure and strong divergent selection shape 
phenotypic diversification in maize landraces. Heredity (in press). 
Ramírez, F. In preparation. Manejo genético de las variedades locales de maíz y flujo 
génico en un sistema agrícola tradicional. Estudio de Caso en México. Ph. D. 
dissertation, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico, D.F. 
Sahlins, M.D., 1972. Stone age economics. Aldine Publ. Co., New York, USA. 
Sanchez, J. J. G., C. W. Stuber and M. M. Goodman. 2000a. Isoenzymatic diversity in the 
races of maize in the Americas. Maydica 45:185-203.  
 
40
Sanchez, J. J. G., M. M. Goodman and C. W. Stuber. 2000b. Isoenzymatic and 
morphological diversity in the races of maize in Mexico. Economic Botany 54:43-
59. 
Seboka B. and A. Deressa. 2000. Validating Farmers’ Indigenous Social Networks for 
Local Seed Supply in Central Rift Valley of Ethiopia. Journal of Agricultural 
Education and Extension 6: 245-254. 
Smale, M., A. Aguirre, M. Bellon, J. Mendoza,  and I.M. Rosas.  1999. Farmer 
management of maize diversity in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico: 
CIMMYT / INIFAP. 1998 Baseline socioeconomic survey. CIMMYT Economics 
Working Paper 99-09.Mexico D.F.: CIMMYT 
Smale, M., M. R. Bellon, A. Aguirre, I. Manuel, J. Mendoza, A. M. Solano, R. Martínez, 
and A. Ramírez. 2003. The economic costs and benefits of a participatory project 
to conserve maize landraces on farms in Oaxaca, Mexico. Agricultural Economics 
29 (1): 265-275. 
Sperling, L., Heidegger, U. Buruchara, R., 1995. Enhancing small farm seed systems: 
Principles derived from bean research in The Great Lakes Region. Network on 
Bean Research in Africa, Occasional Publications Series, No. 15.  Cali, Colombia: 
CIAT. 
Thiele, G., 1999. Informal Potato Seed Systems in the Andes: Why are they important 
and what should we do with them? World Development 27: 83-99. 
Tripp, R., 2000. The organization of farmer seed systems. Relevance for participatory 
plant breeding. Paper presented at the symposium “Scientific Basis for Partici-
patory Improvement and Conservation of Crop Genetic Resources,” Oaxtepec, 
Mexico, 8-14 October 2000. 
Tripp, R., 2001. Seed provision and agricultural development. Overseas Development 
Institute, London, UK. 
Wierema, H., L. Keune, R. Vermeer and C. Almekinders. 1994. Small-scale agriculture 
in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras. The rationality of local systems of seed 





List of CAPRi Working Papers 
01  Property Rights, Collective Action and Technologies for Natural Resource 
Management: A Conceptual Framework, by Anna Knox, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, 
and Peter Hazell, October 1998. 
02   Assessing the Relationships Between Property Rights and Technology Adoption 
in Smallholder Agriculture: A Review of Issues and Empirical Methods, by 
Frank Place and Brent Swallow, April 2000. 
03  Impact of Land Tenure and Socioeconomic Factors on Mountain Terrace 
Maintenance in Yemen, by A. Aw-Hassan, M. Alsanabani and A. Bamatraf, July 
2000. 
04  Land Tenurial Systems and the Adoption of a Mucuna Planted Fallow in the 
Derived Savannas of West Africa, by Victor M. Manyong and Victorin A. 
Houndékon, July 2000. 
05  Collective Action in Space: Assessing How Collective Action Varies Across an 
African Landscape, by Brent M. Swallow, Justine Wangila, Woudyalew Mulatu, 
Onyango Okello, and Nancy McCarthy, July 2000. 
06  Land Tenure and the Adoption of Agricultural Technology in Haiti, by Glenn R. 
Smucker, T. Anderson White, and Michael Bannister, October 2000. 
07  Collective Action in Ant Control, by Helle Munk Ravnborg, Ana Milena de la 
Cruz, María Del Pilar Guerrero, and Olaf Westermann, October 2000. 
08  CAPRi Technical Workshop on Watershed Management Institutions: A 
Summary Paper, by Anna Knox and Subodh Gupta, October 2000. 
09  The Role of Tenure in the Management of Trees at the Community Level:  
Theoretical and Empirical Analyses from Uganda and Malawi, by Frank Place 
and Keijiro Otsuka November 2000. 
10  Collective Action and the Intensification of Cattle-Feeding Techniques a Village 
Case Study in Kenya’s Coast Province, by Kimberly Swallow, November 2000. 
11  Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural Resource 
Management:  Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy, by Anna 





12  Land Dispute Resolution in Mozambique: Evidence and Institutions of 
Agroforestry Technology Adoption, by John Unruh, January 2001. 
13  Between Market Failure, Policy Failure, and “Community Failure”: Property 
Rights, Crop-Livestock Conflicts and the Adoption of Sustainable Land Use 
Practices in the Dry Area of Sri Lanka, by Regina Birner and Hasantha 
Gunaweera, March 2001. 
14  Land Inheritance and Schooling in Matrilineal Societies: Evidence from 
Sumatra, by Agnes Quisumbing and Keijuro Otsuka, May 2001. 
15  Tribes, State, and Technology Adoption in Arid Land Management, Syria, by 
Rae, J, Arab, G., Nordblom, T., Jani, K., and Gintzburger, G., June 2001. 
16  The Effects of Scales, Flows, and Filters on Property Rights and Collective 
Action in Watershed Management, by Brent M. Swallow, Dennis P. Garrity, and 
Meine van Noordwijk, July 2001. 
17  Evaluating Watershed Management Projects, by John Kerr and Kimberly Chung, 
August 2001. 
18  Rethinking Rehabilitation: Socio-Ecology of Tanks and Water Harvesting in 
Rajasthan, North-West India, by Tushaar Shah and K.V.Raju, September 2001. 
19  User Participation in Watershed Management and Research, by Nancy Johnson, 
Helle Munk Ravnborg, Olaf Westermann, and Kirsten Probst, September 2001. 
20  Collective Action for Water Harvesting Irrigation in the Lerman-Chapala Basin, 
Mexico, by Christopher A. Scott and Paul Silva-Ochoa, October 2001. 
21  Land Redistribution, Tenure Insecurity, and Intensity of Production: A Study of 
Farm Households in Southern Ethiopia, by Stein Holden and Hailu Yohannes, 
October 2001. 
22  Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights, by Ruth Meinzen-Dick and 
Rajendra Pradhan, January 2002. 
23  International Conference on Policy and Institutional Options for the Management 
of Rangelands in Dry Areas, by Tidiane Ngaido, Nancy McCarthy, and Monica 





24  Climatic Variablity and Cooperation in Rangeland Management: A Case Study 
From Niger, by Nancy McCarthy and Jean-Paul Vanderlinden, September 2002. 
25  Assessing the Factors Underlying the Differences in Group Performance:  
Methodological Issues and Empirical Findings from the Highlands of Central 
Kenya, by Frank Place, Gatarwa Kariuki, Justine Wangila, Patti Kristjanson, 
Adolf Makauki, and Jessica Ndubi, November 2002.  
26  The Importance of Social Capital in Colombian Rural Agro-Enterprises, by 
Nancy Johnson, Ruth Suarez, and Mark Lundy, November 2002. 
27  Cooperation, Collective Action and Natural Resources Management in Burkina 
Faso: A Methodological Note, by Nancy McCarthy, Céline Dutilly-Diané, and 
Boureima Drabo, December 2002. 
28  Understanding, Measuring and Utilizing Social Capital:  Clarifying Concepts and 
Presenting a Field Application from India, by Anirudh Krishna, January 2003. 
29  In Pursuit Of Comparable Concepts And Data, About Collective Action, by Amy 
Poteete And Elinor Ostrom, March 2003. 
30  Methods of Consensus Building for Community Based Fisheries Management in 
Bangladesh and the Mekong Delta, by Parvin Sultana and Paul Thompson, May 
2003.   
31  Formal And Informal Systems In Support Of Farmer Management Of Agro-
Biodiversity: Some Policy Challenges To Consolidate Lessons Learned, by 
Marie Byström, March 2004.   
32  What Do People Bring Into the Game:  Experiments in the Field About 
Cooperation in the Commons, by Juan-Camilo Cárdenas and  Elinor Ostrom, 
June 2004.  
33  Methods for Studying Collective Action in Rural Development, by Ruth 
Meinzen-Dick, Monica Di Gregorio, and Nancy McCarthy, July 2004.  
34  The Relationship between Collective Action and Intensification of Livestock 
Production:  The Case of Northeastern Burkina Faso, by Nancy McCarthy, 
August 2004.  
35  The Transformation of Property Rights in Kenya’s Maasailand: Triggers and 





36  Farmers’ Rights and Protection of Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, by 
Stephen B. Brush, January 2005.   
37  Between Conservationism, Eco-Populism and Developmentalism – Discourses in 
Biodiversity Policy in Thailand and Indonesia, by Heidi Wittmer and Regina 
Birner, January 2005. 